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CAP: The common agricultural policy aims.to rationalize agricultural 
production and establish a Community system of aids and· import 
surveillance. It encompasses over 95% of the Community's 
agricultural production. 
ECU: The monetary unit used by the Community for financial aid. It 
is calculated on the basis of a basket comprising the currencies 
of the ten EEC Member States and represents a weighted average 
of their market values. 
Levies: Levies amount to countervailing duties charged on imports in 




A critical motivation of the post-war drive for European 
unification was the desire to change the bases for Europe's relations 
with the rest of the world in an era of dominance by extraneous 
continental super-powers and of the decolonization of its own nine-
teenth-century empires. The strategy adopted after the col lapse of 
the European Defense Community (EDC) of concentrating on economic 
integration, and assuming that its inevitable success would facilitate 
political unification, left the European communities with few instru-
ments for the pursuit of external policy. Even within the economic 
sphere joint methods of pol icy formation have only fully superceded 
the national institution in the fields of commerce and agriculture. 
The European Community is today linked by many bilaterial 
agreements with i ndi vi dual third countries, and it is committed to 
many more. The vast majority of these agreements are based on pre-
ferential trade arrangements, invariably granting the partner country 
easier access on a global basis for its industrial exports to the 
Community Market. Even before the Community enlargement, the Commu-
nity was the biggest single export market for a large number of third 
countries, including many of the Mediterranean regions. Purely 
trading motivations led to a large number of countries seeking some 
form of special privileged relationship with the Community, and this 
polar attraction has been further increased by the enlargement. 
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II. THE HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC OMMUNITY 
The EEC, created in 1958, ·provides a broad foundation for a 
united Europe. The development began centuries ago but the first 
practical steps were taken in the years following the Second World 
War. 
In 1946, Winston Churchi 11 ca 11 ed upon European states to 
create a kind of United States of Europe. This initiative was follow-
ed in 1947 by the Marshall Plan which asked the European nations to 
draw up a joint program for the reconstruction of the devastated 
continent. That same year, the Benelux Customs Union between the 
Netherlands and the Belgium-Luxemburg Economic Uni on entered into 
force as the first concrete step toward economic unity (29). 
The organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was 
established in 1948 as a result of the Marshal Plan. During that same 
year, the Congress of Europe took steps toward the creation of the 
Council of Europe. The Councll became a forum for discussing means of 
creating a politically unified Europe, but it was unable to take any 
concrete steps in this direction (29). 
In 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, pro-
posed the European Coal ·and Steel Community (ECSC). Shortly after the 
Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC was signed, a draft treaty for the 
European Defense Community was prepared. The EDC was designed to 
solve the problems of German contributions to the European defense, 
but it was rejected by the French Parliament (15). 
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The European unity movement took a new direction after the 
defeat of the EDC. The six members of the ECSC (Belgium, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands) 
agreed at Messina, Italy, in 1955 to create a full economic union and 
to unite in their efforts to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes 
(29). 
Negotiations were carried on in the last half of 1956 con-
cerning the treaties of the new communities: the European Economic 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. On March 25, 
1957, the treaties were signed in Rome and were ratified by the 
national Parliaments by the end of that year. The EEC entered into 
force on January 1, 1958, and the institutions of the Community were 
immediately set up in Brussels (27). 
The Treaty of Rome marked the convergence of two tendencies 
which have appeared in Europe since the end of World War II: A 
pol it i cal trend· toward international rapprochement and an economic 
trend towards the expansion of markets (2). 
Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome provides for an association 
with the community of the "non-European countries and territories 
which ·have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands'. The objectives of the association were to: 
'promote the economic and social development of the 
countries and territories and .to establish close 
economic relations between them and the community as a 
whole'* 
*Treaty of Rome, Part IV. Article 131 (22, P. 26). 
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III. THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES 
The Maghreb is bordered by the Mediterranean in the north, 
the Sahara in the south, and the Atlantic on the west with a total 
population of 49,100 thousand (Table XIV). Therefore, it is geo-
graphically separated from the EEC states (1). 
The economic and social condition of Algeria, Tunisia, and 
Morocco before and after the French Period are important questions in 
any discussion which attempts to understand these independent states. 
The relationship between Europe and these states dates back to May 25, 
1830, when the Debt Crisis arose (17). The Europeans entered North-
west Africa, bringing with them western institutions. They imposed 
these standards, and the indigenous cul tu res could not resist them 
(21). 
By the twentieth century, when the nationalist-independence 
movements began to have more influence, many of·the inhabitants of the 
Maghreb countries stood in a cultural "no man's land", somewhere 
between the tradi ti ona 1 culture and the new one introduced by the 
Europeans (17). 
In Algeria, before the revolution of 1954, Europeans owned 
approximately one-third of the cultivatible land and nearly all the 
choice land. Actually, the French vastly increased the amount of land 
in production, from roughly 1.4 million acres in 1830 when the popula-• 
tion was perhaps 2 million; to 7 million acres in 1954 when 10 million 
people inhabited Algeria (21). 
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By 1954, Algeria's trade volume reached $1.023 million with 
imports amounting to $623 million and exports reaching $400 mi 11 ion. 
The customs union between Algeria and Metropolitan France accounted 
for 79 percent of these exports. A trade deficit of $223 mill ion 
resulted from the determined effort to raise living standards in 
Algeria by importing machinery and capital goods (1). 
After 1912 the French systematically obtained some of the 
best land in Morocco. Of ·the 11 million acres under cultivation in . 
1950, approximately 2.5 million acres were owned by six to seven 
thousand French; 850,000 Moroccans held the remainder (1). 
Morocco often suffered a trade deficit. In 1950, imports 
exceeded exports by $10 million. France took 60 percent of the goods 
sent abroad and furnished 68 percent of. the imports to Morocco (17). 
Of the three Northwest African French dependents; Tunisia was 
the sma 11 est, the most tranquil , and unfortunately, the poorest in 
natural resources. 
The Europeans held approximately 26 percent of the land under 
cultivation. On the average, French farms ran 750 acres, while 
Italian holdings were one-tenth that size (1). 
Cereals could, in good years, be exported; usually some 40 
percent of agricultural income came from them (1). The entire Esparto 
grass crop was bought by Britain. Tunisian wines, produced by French 
and Italian families, sold well on the domestic market on the other 
side of the Mediterranean. 
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Phosphates, iron, lead, and zinc are in good supply. The 
quality of the Tunisian phosphate deposits is below that mined i.n 
Morocco, but through processing,. super-phosphates are produced and 
sold in large amounts, enough to supply 10 percent of the world's 
consumption in 1955. Iron ore, lead, and zinc are important exports, 
but demand and price depend on the total world production and consump-
tion of those products. Tunisia also exports salt and cement (17) . 
. IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES AND THE EEC 
The institutional relationship between the Maghreb countries 
and the European Community is not uni form. Algeria, a French terri-
tory when the Community came into existence, was given membership 
status under Article 237 of the Rome Treaty by virtue of this associa-
tion (1). Since gaining independence in 1962, Algeria's legal status 
has not been settled and various European Community members have been 
regulating trade with it in different ways. But the preferred treat-
ment of Algeria since its independence is still being formalized 
through an association agreement (17). 
• In 1967 the total value of imports from EEC was 275.7 million 
dollars for Morocco and 126.9 million dollars for Tunisia. However, 
the value of exports from Morocco to EEC in 1967 totaled to 256. 8 
million dollars. In the same year the exports of Tunisia to EEC came 
up to 126.9 million dollars (Table I, II). 
7 
Tunisia and Morocco signed association agreements with the 
European Community in 1969 under Article 238 of the Rome Treaty (11). 
Unlike 'the Greek and Turkish agreements, which were concluded under 
the same article, these are only partial associations which do not 
envisage full membership in the future. They provide for weak insti-
tutional links and include to date no financial aid ·or commitment to 
common policies. They are limited to preferential trade provisions in 
the agricultural and industrial sectors covering about 70 percent of 
Tunisia's exports to the European Community and 60 percent of 
Morocco's exports (12). The European Community member states have 
offered Algeria similar terms, pending the conclusion of an associa-
tion agreement (1). 
The actual impact of the links with the European Community on 
the three countries has varied in accordance with their respective 
national objectives and development strategies. The guiding principle 
of the Algerian development pl an has been the attainment of economic 
independence and self-sustaining growth based on a coherent structure 
of intersecting chains of sectors which reinforce one another and help 
to insulate the economy against external pressures. Closely allied to 
this ambitious aim of rapid internal advancement is an attempt to 
effect a radical ,break with the traditional division of labor imposed 
by the international capitalist economy (24). 
Algeria's natura 1 gas and oil resources a re used to the 
maximum in this effort to replace subservience and dependence by 
independent integration. In particular, these natural resources are 
8 
used to diversify Algeria's exports and markets and to minimize 
foreign indebtedne·ss (24). 
In Tunisia, the failure of the attempt to promote agri cul-
tural modernization as the key element in the effort to gain economic 
independence through an expanded internal market, presaged a return to 
dependence on foreign aid, tourism and traditional economic policies 
which do not lead to good predictions for Tunisia's developmental 
prospects. 
The agricultural sector is of even greater importance to the 
Moroccan economy, employing 62 percent of the active population in 
1968. Here half-hearted and singµlarly unsuccessful official efforts 
to carry out structural reform meant general stagnation and the 
perpetuation of backward conditions. In contrast to the Algerian 
ambition of integration into the international market at the level of. 
the industrialized countries, the external economic policies of 
Tunisia and Morocco are not geared toward jettisoning the colonial 
division of labor which characterizes their relationship with the 
advanced industrial riations (18). 
This, in broad outline, is the background against which the 
effects of trade relations with the European Community must be 
evaluated. The.Tunisian and Moroccan regimes have concentrated their 
efforts on obtaining preferential access for their agricultural goods 
to the European Market. Their success in this effort carries few 
benefits for their economic development and may actually impede it. 
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It encourages the maintenance of the existing export structures which 
reflect a center-periphery relationship in which the periphery people 
are "the hewers of wood and the drawers of water" (24, P. 6). 
Moroccan oranges, which figure prominently in negotiations 
with the European Community, are a case in point. The orange industry 
is an enclave geared almost entirely to sale within the Moroccan 
economy. The encl ave nature means that the profit which comes from 
the sale of oranges has a very limited multiplier effect because of 
limited reinvestment of profits and this accentuates the imbalance 
within the agricultural sector and constrains development. 
In a conscious attempt to avoid this pitfall the Algerian 
planners have sought, while safeguarding Algeria's position in the. 
European wine market, to concentrate on increasing the ratio of 
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods (particularly processed 
petroleum products) in their total exports so as to prevent an adverse 
shift in the terms of trade and enhance the long-term· development of 
their economy. 
The attitude of the three Maghreb countries differs in 
cooperation as well as in trade. In the past, cooperation was limited 
to food aid. This type of aid hampers the development of balanced 
food production and perpetuates the dependence of the recipients 
through a combination of higher prices for fluctuating exports and 
artificially cheap imports (9). The impact of the financial and 
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technical aid that is included in the new agreements will be 
conditioned not simply by its magnitude but by the way it is used. 
Algeria attaches the. greatest importance to financial and 
technological cooperation with Europe and capital inflows in the form 
of loans and grants as well as private investment. These are likely. 
to be channelled centrally and mobilized to accelerate the pace of_ 
industrialization without compromising the jealously guarded natiqnal 
freedom of action. 
In Tunisia and Morocco, foreign capital is more likely to 
gravitate towards the profitable but tertiary sectors of oranges and 
tourism and consequently have a limited multiplier effect on the 
economy as a whole and even harmful consequences in raising the level 
of fore_i gn indebtedness. 
When the Treaty of Rome was signed, the governments of the 
member states declared their readiness to propose to the French area 
independent countries negotiations with a goal of concluding associa-
tion agreements (26). However, in spite of the first move made by the 
Tunisian government in 1959, Tunisia and Morocco wait.ed for Algeria to 
gain independence in July 1962 before seeking to· define their rela-
tionship with the Community. On October 3, 1963, Tunisia, and on 
' 
December 14th of the same year, Morocco submitted application for the 
opening of negotiations with the Community (10). 
During exploratory talks in 1964, Morocco and Tunisia stated 
that they favored an agreement which would secure for them, within a 
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free trade area, the widest possible preferential arrangements in the 
commercial field while, at the same time, taking into account the 
degree of economic development attained by each of the trade partners. 
These agreements were also to include a section on financial and 
technical cooperation, envisaging financial aid, technical assistance 
and provisions relating to manpower (10). 
The actual negotiations began in July 1965, on the basis of·a 
partial - mandate, limited to commercial exchanges and covering only 
some of the exports from Tunisia and Morocco to the Community. New 
terms of reference adopted in 0ctober.1967 made it possible to extend 
the negotiations to certain other products such as durum wheat and 
preserves, but Tunisia and Morocco realized how long it would inevit-
ably take to conclude the agreements they originally ha_d in mind. 
They, therefore, asked for the rapid conclusion of ari agreement that,· 
although limited to those items which the Council had already listed, 
would be immediately applicable. It should, however, be understood 
that this was simply a first step towards an· overall association 
agreement. This realistic and pragmatic approach was finally accepted 
(24). 
These agreements are based on· Article 238 of the Treaty of· 
Rome. They are an important step on the road towards full application 
of the declaration of· intention annexed to the Treaty of Rome. They 
are valid for five years from the date they come into effect (29). 
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A. 1969 TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Advantages Granted By The EEC: 
The industrial products originating in Morocco or Tunisia may 
be imported into the Community duty free and without quantity 
restrictions. Products which come under the ECSC Treaty and cork 
products, however, were excluded. 
The Community also reserves the right to re-establish customs 
duties for certain petroleum products refined in Tunisia and Morocco 
when importing them causes serious difficulties on the market of one 
or more member states and, without having to provide detailed justifi-
cation, when these imports exceed 100,000 tons from either of the two 
countries. 
For products such as spaghetti, macaroni and couscous, the 
Community levies the variable duty applicable to non-member countries, 
but grants exempt"ion from the fixed duty which affords industrial 
protection for community producers and amounts to 15 percent of the 
import value of these items. 
For Morocco, non-agricultural products represented 40 percent 
of total imports and 55 percent of total Tunisian imports to the 
Community in 1969. The economic value of the excluded products in 
this sector was negligible (27). 
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The agreements made for agricultural products were designed 
fo maintain the protection and the preferences enjoyed by Community 
producers while maintaining the balance at that time between competing 
Mediterranean producers. From the point of view of the associated 
states, the advantages they enjoy on the French market also had to be· 
taken into account. In most cases these consisted of duty-free entry 
for quantities which corresponded largely with what these countries 
could export to the·Community. 
Crude olive oil imports enjoy an economic advantage in the 
form of a reduction of 5 European Currency Unit (ECU) per 100 Kg on 
the levy applicable to non-member countries, provided that the associ-
ated states abide by a. mi.nimum selling price, which, for comparable 
quality, is not less than the world cif price of 'olive oil· plus the 
amount of the reduction ( 5). Over and above this economic advantage, 
there is to be a commercial advantage in the form of a standard 
abatement of 0.5 E.C.U. per 100 Kg. Refined olive oil produced in the 
Maghreb was exempted from the fixed portion of the levy. Imports of 
durum wheat from Morocco enjoy a standard abatement of 0. 5 E.C. U. per 
ton (this provision does not apply to Tunisia} (20). 
There are concessions on citrus fruits (oranges, tangerines, 
clementines and lemons), on which Tunisia and Morocco enjoy a 50 
• percent preference of the common customs duty provided that the prices 
of their citrus fruits on the Community's internal market are no less 
than the reference price for the period concerned. 
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For all the concessions set out above, a provision is made 
that, should the Community's regulations be modified, the Community 
reserves the right to modify the preferential arrangements conceded, 
on the condition that it grants Morocco or Tunisia a comparable 
advantage (24). 
2. Advantages Granted By The Maghreb Countries: 
In the tariff sector, Morocco grants a tariff reduction of 25 
percent of the usual ta riff for many products. Quotas a re bound at 
the 1969 level of liberalization. However, Morocco reserves the right 
to introduce quantitative restrictions on products which are l ibera-
1 ized at the 1969 level (1). 
In the tariff sector, Tunisia grants the Community a reduc-
tion on a number of products, corresponding to 70 percent of the 
preference which France enjoys on these products. These reductions 
were spread over 36 months from the date .the agreements went into 
force (5). 
In the quota sector, Tunisia may, however, introduce quanti-
tative restrictions on products which are liberalized on the condition 
that it liberalizes products representing an equivalent volume of 
. imports from the Community (5). 
For both countries, a special arrangement for industrializa-
tion purposes, with "a lower rate of decrease" clause, is provided in 
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the quotas introduced by Tunisia and Morocco for certain products 
originating in the Community (24, P. 3). 
Speci a 1 arrangements were made concerning the geographical 
and economic situation for these two countries. 
Algeria's first approach as an independent country dates back 
to 1962 when the aim was to maintain the status with regards to trade. 
However, in 1963 the A 1 geri an authorities expressed the desire, 1 i ke 
Morocco and Tunisia, to start negotiating an overall agreement with 
the EEC. The negotiations were not ,to get off the ground properly, 
however, until 1972 (6). 
Meanwhile, trade arrangements between Algeria and the Commu-
nity were to develop rather haphazardly. With certain restrictions, 
Algerian products continued to benefit from duty-free entry to the 
French· market (except for wine from 1971), but were given third 
country treatment by Italy from 1968 to the current time. In Germany 
and the Benelux countries, A 1 geri a was accorded a tariff reduction 
which existed between the European Community in 1962. On the other 
hand, it was not until January 4, 1973, that Algeria received third 
country treatment_ by the Community, thus doing away with any pre-
ferential treatment (6). 
It was not until 1972 that the community decided to open 
negotiations with an offer covering trade arrangements only. However, 
the same year saw the es tab 1 i shment of the overa 11 Mediterranean 
policy, whereby, the Nine tried to take an overall view of their 
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future relations with the Mediterranean Countries and, in, so doing 
establ.ish the essential points of the agreements to be concluded or 
renewed with the countries concerned (27). 
Within this framework, increased importance was given to the 
question ·of financial and technical cooperation with the. Maghreb 
countries. 
B. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES' FOREIGN RELATIONS 
AFTER THE 1969 AGREEMENTS 
The ratio between exports and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or 
between imports and the GDP appears high for all three of the Maghreb 
nations. In the case of Algeria, the export ratio was 24 percent in 
1970 and the import ratio was 30 percent. With regard to Tunisia, 
these ratios were 13 percent and 22 percent respectively; and for 
Morocco, 13 percent and 19 percent (10). 
These three countries, however, have access to an equally 
high measure of external resources, either in the form of grants or 
credits. They face a foreign indebtedness which is generally 
considerable. According to the data supplied by the World Bank, in 
1971 the ratio between debts and exports was 18 percent in Tunisia and 
9 percent in Morocco. As far as Algeria is concerned, foreign esti-
mates set this ratio at 15 to 17 percent, although according to 
Algeria it is 10 to 13 percent. 
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Agriculture products ·(Algerian wine, Tuni_sian oil and 
Moroccan citrus fruits) constitute from 14 to 16 percent of the total 
exports from each country. In addition, from a geographical point of 
view, trade on the part of these three countries appears to be con-
centrated equally. In 1971, Morocco exported to the European Commu-
nity 57 percent of its total exports. It purchases 49 percent of its 
overall imports from the European Community. Tunisia send to the EEC 
(1969-1971 average) 55 percent of its exports and imports the same 
percentage from the EEC. For Algeria as well, in 1970 the EEC was the 
principal supplier at 65 percent. To all this, finally, must be added 
the importance to Algeria and, to a lesser extent, to Morocco, of 
remittances by emigrants and the importance of revenue resulting from 
tourism accruing to Tunisia and, to a 1 esser degree, to Morocco. 
Beyond the similarity of dependency and integration projected 
by these figures, the importance and dynamism of these images appears 
to differ from country to country. This point is worth discussing. 
In more explicit terms the question to be answered is: What relatiori-
ship exists between the different developmental programs and foreign 
relations of the Maghreb countries? 
The case of Algeria is the most interesting. Algerian 
economic policy is progressing along two primary lines. On the one 
hand, Algeria is attempting to attain independence by a prudent and 
strict financial policy, both internal and foreign. Sources of energy_ 
play a fundamenta·1 role in this, provided above all, that they are 
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appropriately managed. On the other hand, Algeria is trying to become 
integrated into the i nternati ona l market through a strong basic 
industrial sector and through highly capital intensive and competitive 
techniques. Algeria is explicitly attempting to overthrow the type of 
integration which links it to the international market in the form 
typical of underdeveloped, colonial countries. It prefers an indus-
trialized integration or a change from a dependent integration.to an 
independent integration. This, of course, is the other functional and 
essential side of the picture of internal development traced 
previously. 
The primary_ financial • objective of the Algerian economic 
policy towards foreign .countri.es is that of maintaining an autonomous 
equilibrium in the long-term balance of payments. Various elements 
render this task arduous. First, the agricultural-food balance bears 
a deficit arising out of the deficiencies in the development of 
agriculture. Second,. there is an important lag between effective 
integrated functioning of industrialization projects and their gradual 
start. During this time lag -- that is, during the current phase --
the importation of producer goods weighs very heavily on the commer-
cial balance. Furthermore, importation of producer goods is achieved 
by means of credits. Algeria's high level of foreign indebtedness is 
due to contracting for commercial credit to finance importation of 
equipment and other basic capital commodities. For example, between 
1970 and 1971, foreign indebtedness increased from 8 to 9 bi 11 ion 
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dinars to 12.7 to 13.7 billion. This is an•increase of 50 percent 
that can be explained by a 1.5 billion dinar loan from European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and a 1.7 billion dinar loan from the Soviet 
government for the enlargement of the steel industry (17). 
These difficulties reflect both structural problems and 
intense industrial transitional efforts. Counterbalancing factors 
that permit equilibrium in the balance of payments, consist of remit-
tances from emigrants and of natural gas and petroleum resources. 
Nevertheless, it is most importantly Algerian management of these 
resources that gives them a function in the economy tending towards 
equilibrium and autonomy. Algerian strategy toward long-term equili-
brium and autonomy· in the balance of payments, far from weighing upon 
financial contributions resulting from energy resources, has made 
these resources a platform for development and diversification of the 
country's own financial possibilities. 
However, the keystone of equilibrium regarding Algerian 
payments consists of recovery of national resources of energy and of 
re-evaluation of prices. These provisions should not be viewed so 
much as a supplementary source of income, either fiscal or from 
exports, but primarily as performing the essential function of estab-
1 ishing heavy Algerian imports of producer goods which have been 
affected by a high level of inflation. Secondly, they should be 
considered as a means of placing energy at the disposal of the 
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Algerian economy at a cost lower than the international rate, with 
consequent effects upon the commercial balance. 
Algerians are running a race against time. Difficulties 
greater than those in the agricultural sector and delays or ineffici-
encies in the industrial sector could subject the financial· projects 
to severe strain along with the entire plan for development. If the 
mechanism for development is not set into motion on schedule, certain 
current tensions (unemployment, inflation, low agri"cultural producti-
vity) could reach a breaking point and subsequently be transformed 
into vehicles for a new dependency. This is all the more true since 
the highly capital intensive type of development chosen by the 
Algerians integrates them to a greater extent and exposes them even 
further. Thus Algeria needs international assistance and cooperation 
to sell its wine, to maintain present emigration rates and to export 
items that should be. only temporary industrial surpluses. But, above 
all, Algeria needs international aid to obtain financial resources and 
technical cooperation and turn its available supplies of energy to its 
maximum advantage. 
The situation in Morocco and Tunisia· differs in two funda-
mental respects from that prevailing in Algeri!).. First, these two 
countries do not have surplus energy (Morocco), or have it in only a 
limited quantity (Tunisia), although they possess an. agricultural 
surplus. Second, the resources provided by this surplus come within a 
structure which appears inadequate to transform them into development 
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of the economy. Algerian foreign relations are functional with 
respect to ·a plan for independent.integration, which in the not too 
distant future should re-integrate Algeria into the international 
market at a level· quite different from that at which it started at 
independence. Moroccan and Tunisian foreign relations, on the con-
trary, fix their respective economies on the level of international 
integration in which they find themselves. Therefore, integration and 
dependency have d'i fferent meanings, depending on ·whether one is 
speaking of Algeria or of. Tunisia and Morocco. For the latter two 
nations, integration takes the form of actual dependency. For 
Algeria, provided that its plans do succeed, it should take the form 
of interdependency with the industrial sector of the capitalistic 
world. 
The Moroccan and Tunisian agricultural surplus is one of the 
products for export. Especially in the case of Morocco, the food 
(import, export)· deficit is noteworthy and constitutes a negative 
factor in that country's relations with foreign countries. The 
exportable agricultural surplus, which for Tunisia consists primarily 
of olive oil and for Morocco of fruit and vegetables, is generally 
produced by the most modern sector and constitutes an enclave in the 
economy of the two countries because it exists only as a result of the 
existence of foreign nations. On the other hand, imports of producer 
goods are considerable because an industrial sector exists, but they 
are not compensated by an equivalent productivity increase in the 
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sector itself. This structural imbalance is, with regard to Morocco, 
partially countered by remittances from emigrants and, to a lesser 
extent, by tourism. Nevertheless, it is the recourse to foreign 
resources, in the form of grants and investments, that plays a funda-
mental role in Tunisia and Morocco's foreign relations (3). This 
represents another important point of divergence from the Algerians, 
especially· as it concerns direct investments. This recourse takes the 
form of an indebtedness for which only scarce possibilities for rescue 
can be foreseen. 
On the other hand, in economies such as those of Tunisia and 
Morocco, direct foreign investment .. is concentrated in sectors geared 
toward exports and tourism. There it attracts local capital and 
established an activity which has limited multiplier effects upon the 
economy. Recent Tunisian prescriptions for foreign investment, which 
practically constitute regulations for the establishment of free 
ports, may favor all types of investment. Actually, direct foreign 
investments in an economic and· political context such as that of 
Morocco and Tunisia are placed beside enclaves of agricultural produc-
tion and exportation; and together with these risk increasing the 
dualism of the economy. 
The foreign relations of Tunisia and Morocco is based· upon 
the need for cooperation and aid to augment· or maintain their 
agricultural export level and to obtain financial assistance and 
direct investments. Even if they are obtained, the problem is whether 
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they wi 11 be useful and to whom they wil 1 be useful. In the case of 
Algeria, it.might be possible to reply in terms of national develop-
ment and growth. In the case of Tunisia and Morocco, this appears 
more difficult. 
At the end of 1972, in an attempt to organize the relation-
ships with the Maghreb nations and with nearly all other Mediterranean 
countries, the Commission proposed a global policy for the entire 
Mediterranean region. The Commission's proposals envisaged that .the 
European Community would progressively establish a free-trade area for 
agricultural and industrial products from the region, and at the.same 
time institute a program for technical and financial assistance. It 
should also develop an acceptable· plan for labor emigration and for 
cooperation for environmental protection (26). Exchange of industrial 
products would be liberalized at varying speeds, depending upon ·the 
degree of development of the individual countries. The most delicate 
questions would be that of ensuring, in spite of restrictions imposed 
by the common agricultural policy (CAP), liberalization of agricul-
tural exchanges sufficient enough to reach the coverage required by. 
the General Agreement of Tariffs and_Trade (GATT) so that a free-trade 
area can legitimately be spoken of (13). In view of the importance of ·, 
agricultural exchange in the Mediterranean, the Commission has cal-
culated that at least 80 percent of the Community's agricultural 
imports from co~ntries of this area must be liberalized (20). 
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This overall policy has generated criticism and much 
discussion. The accession of the three new member nations has had the 
_effect of breaking its application and reducing its more abstract 
aspects in any case, this policy, conceived with a view towards a 
multilateral approach is shifting towards a set of bilateral 
agreements. 
In this atmosphere, at the end of June 1973, the Council gave 
to the Commission a first ma_ndate for negotiation w.ith the association 
of Algeria and renewal of associations with Tunisia and Morocco. By 
the end of 1974, negotiations were still continuing with an aim to 
reach agreements that would improve the agricultural provi si ans and 
include financial and technical cooperation besides that in trade. 
The negotiations continued in the fall of 1974 and into April 1975, 
and were completed in the first half of January 1976 (10). 
The very real difficulties, recognized by both sides, which 
were encountered in the finalization of certain points of the agree-
ment (particularly in the agricultural sector) again meant ·long 
discussions, periods of reflection and, on the Community side, certain 
internal adjustments. These difficulties are themselves a measure of 
the determination of both parties to reach a con cl us ion, but they al so 
serve as an indication of the direction which future cooperation would 
take. 
Although negotiations were centered on reaching the necessary 
compromises between directly competing sectors· of the respective 
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economies, the main aim of cooperation was to help develop their 
complementary aspects, thus their independence. 
C. THE 1976 COOPERATION AGREEMENTS 
The aim of the agreements is to establish a "wide-ranging 
cooperation" between the -trading partners. They make it possible. to 
combine the various operations likely to contribute to the economic, 
technical and financial cooperation in the social field (10, P. 3). 
The agreements have a_n unlimited duration, so that this comp re hens i ve 
cooperation is set in the correct perspective to enable longer-term 
development problems to be handled. 
Although the agreements with the individual Maghreb countries 
are slightly different, they all contain common elements: 
' 
1) duty-free access to industrial goods by the EEC; 
2) preferential access for main agricultural goods within 
well-defined limits; 
3) access to developmental grants and loans funded by the 
EEC; 
4) renunciation by the EEC of preferential access to the 
markets of developing countries in the Mediterranean 
area, and, 
5) consultation privileges for expanding and improving the 
agreements and dealing with any problem that may arise 
( 4). 
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In addition to the Community's financial participation in 
production and economic infrastructure development in each country, a-
vast field of action has been opened up in the following areas: 
1) marketing and sales promotion; 
2) industrial cooperation {through the organization of 
contacts between firms) by making it easier to acquire 
favorable patents, working to remove non-tariff barriers, 
etc.; 
3) the encouragement .of private investment; 
4) cooperation in the field of science, technology and the 
environment; 
5) cooperation in the fisheries sectors; and, 
6) exchange of information on trends in the economic and 
financial situation. 
With regard to Algeria and Tunisia, cooperation in the area 
of energy exists by encouraging part i ci pati on of Community operators 
in programs for the exploration, production and processing of these 
countries' energy resou·rces and the proper performance of long-term 
contracts concerning the delivery of petroleum products (10). 
Under the agreements, Maghreb countries are not obligated to 
make reci pro cal trade concessions to the EEC but instead they wi 11 
27 
grant the Community "most-favored-nation" treatment (MFN) (6, P. 15). 
This _means that Maghreb countries will extend to the Community any 
favorable trading terms they offer in any subsequent agreements to 
other countries. The only exceptions are if the Maghreb countries 
form a customs union or a free trade area with other countries or if 
measures -are adopted with a view to the economic integration of the 
Maghreb, or measures benefiting the developing countries. In order to 
meet their own industrialization and developmental needs, the Maghreb 
countries can introduce new customs· duties or quotas on Community 
exports. Or, as an alternative, it can increase existing duties and 
quotas but only after consultations have first been held by the 
Cooperation Council. Maghreb and the EEC, as a· provision of the 
agreements, will not discriminate against each other's nationals, 
companies or firms. Certain trade restrictions are allowed because of 
public policy or public security, but they must not "constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade" 
(6, P. 12). 
Under the agreements the goal of the trade provisions is to 
promote trade between the Maghreb countries and the European Community 
and "to insure a better balance in their trade, with a view to in-
creasing the rate of growth. of Maghreb's trade and improving the 
conditions of access for its products to the Community" (6, P. 4). 
These trade provisions, which cover both agricultural and 
industrial products, came into force on July 1, 1976, pursuant to the 
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interim agreement. Maghreb countries' import customs duties were 
abo1ished on that date, except fot products coming within the EEC's 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
1. COOPERATION WITH ALGERIA 
In·1974 Algeria had a trade surplus of just over 70 million 
E.C.U. By 1978, this had turned into a deficit of 1,633.7 million 
E.C.U. By 1979-1980 that deficit was 683.4 million E.C.U. (Table III 
and VII). 
Trade is only one form of relation between the countries, but 
it reflects the close ties between the_ EEC and Algeria. Though its 
relative percentage shows signs of shrinking, the Community continues 
to play a very important role in Algeria's foreign trade (6). 
In 1978 Community exports to Algeria came to 3,635 mi 11 ion 
E.C.U. These exports (consisting mostly of machinery and transport 
equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs, and chemical products) 
received most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. However, the Maghreb 
countries, including Algeria, can introduce import restrictions or 
grant other countries preferences aimed at encouraging regional 
1ntegration. Algeria also has no obligation to grant reciprocal trade 
concessions to the EEC. 
The present structure of Algerian exports shows that Algeria 
mainly exports non-agricultural products. This is explained both by 
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the increase in oil and rr~tural gas prices and the very little growth 
- or even falling off - of agricultural exports (Table IV). However, 
to get an accurate idea of the impact of the agreement, it should be 
pointed out that. the non-agricultural exports consist almost entirely 
of crude oil and natural gas, on which there is no duty under the 
common customs tariff. 
In the trade sector, the general rule in by the agreement is 
that industrial products ''originating'' in Algeria have free access to 
the Community market (6, P. 32)*. The only two exceptions to this 
rule i~ere the restrictions put on cork and petroleum products under 
Article 14. However, on January 1, 1980, these restrictions were 
removed so all industrial products now.have free access. 
/ Most agricultural products are eligible for tariff reductions 
\ '~. . varying from 20 percent to 100 percent. This reduction depends on the 
agricultural products. Several • checks such as quotas, import . 
'•-- .... 
calendars ···and observance of entry prices have been created to protect 
those products that are considered most sensitive (6). 
The agreement also enables the EEC to alter the a_rrangements 
with regard to petroleum products. However, these alterations are 
', subject to consultations within the Cooperation Council at the other 
*The term "originating" applies to all products accompanied by a 
'certificate of origin'. The purpose of the 'originating' concept is 
to guarantee that it really is Algeria who benefits from the conces-
sions granted by the EEC. 
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party's request. Such adjustments may be made under the following 
situations: 
1) adoption of a common definition of origin for petroleum 
products; 
2) adoption of decisions under a common commercial policy, 
or, 
3) establishment of a common energy policy (6). 
Algeria's agricultural exports are substantially less than 
its industrial exports· to the Community. The main Algerian farm 
export to. ttie EEC are citrus-fruit, fresh fruit and vegetab 1 es, alive 
oil and wine for which there are special arrangements (Table VI). In 
1976 these agricultural products were only 2.4 percent of the total 
Algerian exports (Table VI). This is a dramatic drop compared to 
1970, when agricultural products accounted for 17.9 percent. In 1974 
this number was already down to only 2.8 percent. Algeria enjoys 
privileged access to the Community Market for its main farm exports 
and the products imported by the Community are eligible for customs 
duty reductions, ranging from 20 percent to 100 percent. 
In the case of fresh fruit ·and vegetables, the agreement 
provides for tariff reductions varying from 30 percent to 60 percent,. 
although usually withi~ the limits of an import calendar. For 
example, tomatoes have a 60 percent reduction between November 15 and 
,April 30 and water lemons a 50 percent reduction between April 1 and 
June 15. 
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Olive oil is not as important to Algeria as it is to Tunisia, 
but the arrangement established for Tunisia has been extended to 
Algeria and Morocco also. This provision calls for a reduction in the 
levy put on olive oil imports (56 E.C.U. per 100 Kg in 1976) by 20.5 
E.C.U. This reduction is determined annually upon periodic consulta-
tions, the purpose being to identify any difficulties which might 
arise in respect to live oil and to seek appropriate solutions. 
Algeria is taking considerable steps to restrict wine produc-
tion in the country since it has to compete with both low domestic 
consumption arid a saturated EEC market. The Community is already more 
than 100 percent self-sufficient in wine. The agreement is meant to 
give Algeria substantial advantage, taking into account both the 
importance of wine in relation to its agricultural exports as a whole 
and of the Community's responsibilities for its own wine-growing 
sector (Tab 1 e V). The agreement called for a granting of special 
facilities _for Algerian wine exports over a_ five-year transitional 
period to allow Algeria to adjust. to the saturated market condition. 
It is worth noting that Community imports of Algerian wine have not 
varied much in recent years and seem to be stabilizing. 
2. COOPERATION WITH MOROCCO 
In recent years the Moroccan trade balance with the EEC has 




recorded a trade surplus of just over 120 million E.C.U., by 1977 this 
had turned into a deficit of 690 million E.C.U. (Table VIII). 
The main reason for this increasing deficit is that while the 
value of imports doubled from 1974 to 1977, the value of exports 
actually fell. Morocco's main exports are phosphates and agricultural 
products. Although phosphate prices rose sharply in 1973-74, they 
soon fell again. Agricultural production is extremely dependent upon 
the weather and a series of disappointing harvests has affected their 
export. At the same time, the cost of imports, particularly those of 
capital goods and transport equipment essential for industrial devel-
opment, have risen sharply in accordance with world inflation. 
One unusual trend since 1974 is that the share of Moroccan 
agricultural exports to the EEC has risen but at the expense of 
industrial exports. Between 1974 and 1977 agricultural exports rose 6 
percent for a total of 42.6 percent of exports. Usually with 
industri a 1 deve 1 opment, the amount of agricultural exports wi 11 
gradually fall. However., the share of farm exports in terms of total 
exports to all destinations fell by 50 percent from 1974 to 1977. 
Community exports to Morocco in 1977 were worth 1.5 billion 
E. C.U. but this represented a mere 3 percent of its world exports. 
The Community exports ma"fnly machines and transport equipment, manu-
factured goods and chemicals to Morocco. 
Morocco is under no· obligation by the agreements to grant 
reciprocal trade concessions to the EEC. It thus is able to consoli-
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date the present regime and can even increase tariffs so as .to protect 
its infant industries. 
Under the terms of the agreement, Moroccan products can enter 
the Community both duty and quota free. Again, the only two excep-
tions to this general rule are petroleum and cork products. Annual 
duty-free ceilings were fixed on imports of these two sensitive pro-
ducts until December 31, 1979, but have now been abolished. 
The EEC may change the arrangement concerning petroleum 
products but only after consultations with Moroccan representatives of 
the EEC-Morocco joint committee. Changes can take place under the 
same provisions applied to Algeria. 
Under the agreements, about 80 percent of Moroccan agri cul-
tural exports to the Community benefit from tariff concessions ranging 
from 20 to 100 percent off the EEC Common Customs Tariff (CCT). This 
is a significant improvement over the 1969 agreement when only about 
50 percent of farm exports were covered by this tariff concession. 
Morocco thus enjoys privileged access·to the Community market 
for most of its main farm exports. Morocco also continues to enjoy 
privileged access to the French market. The French give concessions 
to some of the products covered by the EEC-Morocco agreement as· we 11 
as to about 10 percent of ·the products which are excluded in the EEC 
agreements. The French concession wi 11 eventua 11 y be phased out, by 
that time ·the Moroccan exporters will have redistributed their exports 
more evenly throughout the Community. 
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Moroccan farm exports to the EEC reached a record height of 
nearly 360 million E.C.U. in 1973 representing 61.5 percent of total 
exports. Because of the sharp rise in phosphate prices in 1974, the 
relative share of farm exports suddenly fell to 37 percent (7). Since 
then it has slowly risen to 42. 6 percent and exports in 1977 were 
close to the 1973 level (Table VIII). 
This fluctuation in Moroccan· farm exports can be explained by 
their dependency on good weather conditions. In 1976-77 the grain 
harvest fell by nearly 50 percent because of a severe drought and it 
is estimated that imports in 1977-78 amounted to nearly two million 
tons as a _result. Despite a big increase in irrigated crop land, ·only 
9 percent of farm land or 600,000 hectares is under an irrigation 
system. 
Morocco is the world's second largest exporter of citrus 
fruits, following behind Spain. Citrus fruits, especially oran'ges and 
mandarines, are Morocco's main farm export products. Other important 
agricultural exports are vegetables (tomatoes, early potatoes and 
dried leguminous vegetables), canned fish, olives and olive oil, 
canned fruit and fruit juice. 
Morocco used to be largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs, but 
drought along with rapid population growth has meant that it has now 
become a substantial food importer. In 1977 it imported 75 million 
E.C.U. of foodstuffs from the EEC; mainly sugar, dairy products, fruit 
and vegetables and cereals (Table IX). This represented about half of 
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its overall food imports. However, Morocco still enjoyed a sub-
stantial food trade surplus of nearly 250 million E.C.U. with the 
Corrmunity in 1977. 
Morocco's most important agricultural export to the EEC is 
citrus fruit, representing about 25 percent of the total value of the 
country's farm exports. -In 1977-78, Morocco exported 127,100 tons of 
mandarines worth 53 million E.C.U. and 262,000 tons of oranges worth 
43 mill ion E. C. U. to the Community for the market (7). The EEC 
produces only 45 percent of its citrus fruit needs and the Community 
market is by far the most important outlet for Moroccan exports (4). 
Fresh fruit and vegetables represent nearly 20 percent of the 
total value of Moroccan agricultural exports to the Conimunity. Under 
th_e agreement, a wide range of fresh fruit and vegetables benefits 
from tariff reductions, with concessions of 30 to 60 percent. How-
ever, these concessions are often limited by import calendars. These 
products were not included in the 1969 agreement (7). 
The most important Moroccan agricultural products concerned 
with in the agreement are tomatoes and early potatoes. Tomato exports 
were worth nearly 60 million E.C.U. in 1977 (7). Under the agreement 
they benefit from a 60 percent tariff concession but only during the 
period from November 15 to April 30. Early potatoes.,· whose exports 
were worth 17 million E.C.U. in 1977, benefit from a 40 percent tariff 
reduction but only between· January 1 and March 31 (7). 
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Although olive oil is a significant Moroccan export, as it 
earned 13 mill ion E.C.U. in 1977, it is not nearly as important to 
Morocco compared to Tunisia where it accounts for half the total value 
of farm exports (5). The Community is only 65 percent self-sufficient 
in olive oil and is a major outlet for Maghreb producers (9). In 1978. 
olive oil exports dropped by 64 tons because of a poor harvest and 
high domestic prices (7). 
Canned sardines are another one of Morocco's major jgricul-
tural exports to the EEC, amounting .. to nearly 15 million E.C.U. in 
1977. Almost two-thirds of the exports go· to the French market. 
Under the agreement, canned sardines·originating in Morocco may enter 
the Community duty-free (7). 
Moroccan wine. exports to the Community have fallen at a 
steady pace since 1973-74 from 640,000 hectolitres to 136,450 hecto-
litres in 1977-78, despite a 80 percent tariff reduction on wine made 
from fresh grapes originating in Morocco (10). Those numbers repre-
sent only 2.6 percent of Community wine imports from third countries 
and was less than expqrts from the other two Maghreb countries ( 3). 
One reason for the decline of Moroccan wine exports is the policy of 
the government encouraging quality wine production instead of table 
wine production. 
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3. COOPERATION WITH TUNISIA 
The Tunisian trade balance with the EEC has remained a steady 
deficit at an average of 420 million E.C.U. a year over the period 
from 1975-1980 (Table X). For the Community, agricultural - imports 
from Tunisia .account only for a small part of its total agricultural· 
imports, .about 2 percent ( 4). This includes a number of products 
which the Community itself produces (5). In conjunction with the 
agreement, it was arranged that Tunisia could continue to enjoy 
preferential access to the French market. 
The Comnunity market represents an· important outlet for 
Tunisian wine, although the quantities imported into the EEC vary con-
siderably (Table XII). Under the agreement, table wines originating 
in Tunisia are eligible for a tariff reduction of 50 percent provided 
that Community reference prices are observed. In the case of quality 
wine, exemption from customs duties is granted within the annual quota 
limit of 50,000 hectolitres, with the condition that they are imported 
in bottles no larger than two litres (5). 
The agreement provides for a tariff reduction generally 
between 30 percent and 60 percent for a• wide range of fresh fruits and 
vegetables but mostly within calendar limits. Apricot pulp is accord-
ed a 30 percent reduction of duties (11.9 percent instead of 17 
percent) (4). Imports of early potatoes are accorded a tariff reduc-
tion of 40 percent from January 1 to March 31 of each year. 
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The tariff reduction for citrus fruit is 80 percent provided 
that Community reference prices are complied with. Tunisia does not 
export large quantities of citrus fruit, unlike the other Maghreb 
countries. 
In 1980, Tunisia supplied nearly 44 percent of the Commu-
nity's olive oil needs, the total value being about 100 million E.C.U. 
(5). This shows the importance of olive oil to Tunisia, as it 
accounts for half the total value of Tunisia's agricultural exports. 
Under the agreement, the Community reduced the levy imposed on un-
refined olive oil by according a trade advantage and an economic 
advantage. The trade advantage consists of a reduction of 0.5 E.C.U. 
per 100 Kg. As it is applied to nearly all EEC suppliers, it is of 
·1ittle significance. The economic advantage amounts to 10 E.C.U. per 
100 Kg. Since July 1, 1976, this economic advantage to the Maghreb 
countries has been doubled. The additional benefit has been renewed 
regularly since then, so that the economic advantage stands at 20 
E. C.U. per 100 Kg. It is granted on the condition that Tunisia levies 
an equivalent charge on exports to ensure that olive oil does not 
enter the Community at a price lower than the threshold price minus 
the 0. 5 E. C. U. of the trade advantage. This economic advantage is 
divided into a fixed component of 10 E.C.U. and a variable component 
determined each year by an exchange of letters between the parties, in 
the light of conditions on the olive oil market (5). 
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Brans and sharps have the same arrangements applied·to olive 
oil except that the levy is calculated in terms of percentages. There 
is a 60 percent reduction in the amount of the variable component 
provided that Tunisia levies an equivalent charge on its exports. 
Levies are calculated on a quarterly basis. Brans and sharps are 
mainly used for animal fodder. They are produced in considerable 
quantities as Tunisia produces a great deal of cereals, but they were 
not used much on the domestic market because of a lack of cattle 
numbers. 
Exports of canned fruit salad originating in Tunisia are 
accorded a 55 percent tariff reduction· if within the limit of 100 
tonnes, the annual designated ceiling amount (Table XI). 
D. ECONOMIC COOPERATION PRINCIPLES AND GOALS 
The cooperation agreements with the EEC aim to promote 
economic and social development of the Maghreb states by means of 
economic, technical and financial cooperation. Special emphasis is 
placed on regional projects and development plans and programs of each 
individual country are complementary. 
EEC and Maghreb cooperation has been developed in the follow-
ing forms: 
1) Economic infrastructure in the development of water and 
power supplies, communications and related areas. This 
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is meant to encourage economic diversity through industry 
and agriculture. 
2) Industrial cooperation to help develop Maghreb industries 
by participation in programs, promotion of business 
contracts, transfers of technology, elimination of 
non~trade barriers, general trade promotion, exchange of 
information and additional cooperation in the fields of 
science, technology, environmental protection and the 
increasing development of fishing (10). 
The agreements provided for a Cooperation Council that can 
extend the scope of cooperation b~tween the EEC and each of the 
Maghreb countries. The Councils periodically redefine the cooperation 
guideli.nes and are also responsible for establishing the methods of 
cooperation, and supervising the implementation of the methods (10). 
In order to make the Agreements effective, a Financial 
Protocol was annexed to each Agreement. These provided over an 
initial five-year period 114 million E.C.U. for Algeria, 130 million 
for Morocco and 95 million for Tunisia (Table XIX). 
If, after their ending on October 31, 1981, new financial 
protocols were necessary, they were to be made available. This did 
occur and the new protocols will be in effect until October 31, 1986. 
Provisions were made for ·interest subsidies, soft loans and extended 
periods of repayment to ensure that financial conditions were appro-
priate for future projects (10). 
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The CoTTJTiunity's financial contributions come under two 
categories, according to the source of the funds. The first of these 
is European Investment Bank (EIB) loans. The EIB is not a commercial 
bank but loans are granted at market rates and terms. EIB capital is 
subscribed by the EEC member states (Table XIX). 
EIB loans to the Maghreb countries are combined with a 2 
percent subsidy that is deducted from non-repayable aid and charged as 
such to the EEC budget (10). Loans such as· these are awarded on a 
priority basis for economic infrastructure of agricultural development 
and schemes for their financing. The EIB also manages certain special 
loans financed from budgetary resources· where there is a need for 
expert appraisal. 
The other category is operations financed from the Community 
budget. _These could be in the form of loans with special terms or 
grants. Loans are made for a 40-year period with a 10-year grace 
period for repayment. The interest .rate is a small 1 percent per year 
(10). These loans are for the formation of risk capital, rural 
development and social infrastructure. The EEC grants are used for 
many purposes. These include operations where the return is not 
immediately obvious, such as trade promotion. 
1. COOPERATION I  THE FIELD OF LABOR 
Maghreb workers are concentrated in just a few Community 
countries, especially in France (Table XIII). As a consequence, labor 
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force problems are dealt with mainly through bilateral agreements. 
This aspect of the Agreements involved institutionalizing by the 
Community as a whole certain principles accepted by each member state. 
These included equal treatment with nationals in working conditi ans, 
wages. and social benefits. The main provisions regarding labor 
relations in the Agreements are the following: 
1) Absence of discrimination in social security. 
2) Accumulations for pension and annuities for the aged, 
medical care, death and invalidity. 
3) Ability to freely transfer such pensions or annuities to 
the worker's country_of origin. 
In return, the Maghreb countries must grant similar agree-
ments to workers from member states in their territory. 
The Cooperation Council is the most important institution for 
implementing the Agreements. The Cooperation Committee assists the 
Council. 
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GREEK ACCESSION 
Greece was required to accept a 11 of the Nine's contractual 
obligations towards non:member countries when it joined the Community 
on January 1, 1981. This made it necessary to adjust EEC-Maghreb 
Agreement protocols. This was concluded at the end of 1981 with 
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Morocco and with Tunisia and Algeria in early 1982. Since the begin-
ning of 1981, Athens has been applying customs duty reductions as 
designated in the Agreement. Greece is to gradually align customs 
tariffs to the ColTIIT)unity CCT. 
44 
V. THE IMPACT OF THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE ENTRANCE INTO THE. 
COMMUNITY ON THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES 
The entry of Spain and Portugal, no matter how economically 
and politically desirable, will require some major adjustments by the 
European Community both in its internal policy and in its behavior 
towards the Maghreb countries. 
One gets a slightly different picture of the expected impact 
of enlargement on non-members if one takes into account recent trends 
in economic development of the countries concerned. In fact, the 
picture will necessarily vary considerably from country to country, as 
the following brief survey indicates. 
Morocco's exports to the EEC represent 11 percent of its GDP, 
a· substantial proportion (28). Morocco is disturbed by the enlarge-
ment not only because agricultural exports are still key elements in 
its balance of payments (over 80 percent are directed to the Commu-
nity), but also because agricultural producti'on, particularly of 
citrus fruits, is export •oriented and more labor intensive than the 
phosphate industry. Phosphates have been a very high foreign exchange 
earner since 1973, but since 1975 relative receipts have been falling. 
Since Morocco is densely populated (Table XIV), its economic and 
political stability may well depend on what the EEC does in response 
to its export needs. 
Algeria's exports to the EEC represent 16 percent of its GDP, 
being mostly oil (28). Algeria will be affected only marginally by 
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enlargement of the EEC agricultural sector. Even the wine problem may 
not be an issue any longer, s i nee production has been d~cli ni ng 
steadily for a number of years, and it exports only 60,000 tonnes each 
year to France, compared to the peak of 900,000 tonnes in col on i al 
days. On the other hand, Algeria will press for free access for 
refined petroleum products and steel, both of which are becoming 
sensitive sectors with surplus capacity in the EEC. 
Tunisian exports to the EEC represent 9 percent of its GDP 
(28). According to recent trends, it should be equally concerned for 
its key agricultural and industrial products (olive oil, chemicals and 
petroleum products). The textile sector has not been growing parti-. 
cularly .rapidly and is not, in any case, a crucial sector in the 
national economy. Other manufacturing industries could pose problems 
in the future, including cork products, since double figure rates of 
growth have not been unusual in this sector during the last ten years. 
Spain is the greatest manufacturer of cork products in the world and 
would be a formidable competitor for Tunisia. 
While Portugese entry into the Community has little effect on 
the Community's agriculture, Spanish entry will change the. face of 
Community farming. Generally, Spanish entry will enlarge the farming 
sector of the EEC by about one third, both in farmland area and the 
number of persons living on the land (4). However, the number of 
consumers will only increase by l3 percent, or 36 million people. 
Besides increasing the number of consumers, even if slight,y, the area 
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of US/lb le agricultural land wi 11 increase by about 27 percent, the 
area of irrigated farmland by approximately 80 percent, the active 
farm population will increase by 28 percent, and the number of farming 
units will go up by 30 percent (4). 
Presently Spain gets lower prices for fruits and vegetables, 
olive oil and most wines than the rest of the Community. After 
membership, these prices will have to be gradually increased to EEC 
levels. This price increase will likely stimulate production and at 
the same time, a market support mechanism will be established for 
Spanish fruits and vegetable production where none existed before. 
This will also encourage production. 
The products most likely to be seriously affected by the EEC 
enlargement are citrus fruit, olive oil, new potatoes, tomatoes, wine• 
and canned fish. 
Morocco and Tunisia risk being the most negatively affected 
by Spanish membership .. Their agricultural production has been geared 
toward the EEC market and they may have problems finding alternative 
markets. This is particularly true for olive oil (Table XXIV). The 
12-nation Community is likely to have 200,000 tons of surplus olive 
oil says the EEC Commission. This is four times what Tunisia exported 
annually to the Community in recent years (28). 
Spain accounts for 47 percent of EEC imports of citrus fruits 
(Table XXII), clearly the dominant supplier.· Morocco supplies only 11 
percent of these same products (4). Sp-ain is also the largest 
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supplier of wine with 39 percent of EEC imports against 13 percent for 
Portugal and 6 percent for Algeria and Tunisia (4). 
Spanish domination of tomato imports of the EEC is even more 
evident (Table XXIII). It supplies 58 percent of imports compared to 
27 percent for Morocco, the main and virtually only, Spanish competi-
tor (28). Spanish supremacy is only questioned in olive oil. Tunisia 
supplies 41. percent of the EEC's outside requirement against 18 
percent from Spain (28). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As this paper has illustrated, the EEC is by far the most 
important trading partner of the Maghreb countries (Table XVII). 
Moreover, it must be considered that these relations have an institu-
tional basis through association agreements, or could acquire them 
within a short time, as is the case of Algeria. It is therefore 
natural that a relationship of such importance, both from an economic 
and a political-institutional standpoint, has such a noteworthy 
influence upon the development of the Maghreb countries (20). 
An examination of these agreements can be conducted in 
different ways. Community rhetoric takes it for granted· that they 
represent an advantage for Maghreb nations, and Community spokesmen 
concentrate their attention on the improvements in agricultural 
aspects of the agreements. Because the CAP basically continues to 
represent protection for European farmers, many of whom produce the 
same items as Maghreb farmers, this Community agricultural contribu-
tion continues to be unsatisfactory from the Maghreb viewpoint, in 
spite of the ingenuity of officials in Brussels to invent complicated 
exceptions to the already complicated Community rules for agricultural 
pol icy. Another approach to the problem, however, is to ask whether 
the agricultural aspect' is really so important, or to demand further 
clarification of its importance. For an examination of EEC-Maghreb 
relations more closely connected with development problems, the latter 
approach appears to be more useful. 
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In reality, the agricultural approach is less important than 
is generally believed as a result of an observation of the prominence 
it is given on the negotiating stage. This becomes apparent if the 
requirement for development of the Maghreb nations rather than of 
their export structure is· taken into account. In fact, the. efforts 
exerted to maintain a place on the European orange, olive oil or fresh 
tomato markets·, tend to maintain and consolidate the present export 
structure of the Maghreb Co.untries. Does this represent an advantage 
for the development of the Maghreb nations? Algeria decided that it 
is not advantageous. Their defence of outlets .for their wine cur-
rently assisted by purchase commitments on the part of the Savi et 
Union is acknowledged to be transitory. Algerian attention is 
directed towards an agricultural production destined, above all, to 
feed its population and towards an export structure of predominantly 
industrial nature. The unexpected closure of the French market to 
Algerian wine bears witness to this situation. 
In rea 1 ity, the Algerian government seems .to be oriented 
towards .using possible association relationships with the EEC· to 
diversify its own exports rather than to crystallize the present 
structure. This is reason ab 1 e because the true advantage offered by 
association agreements lies in the almost total liberalization of 
industrial trade and not in tortuous agricultural concessions. 
For Tunisia and Morocco, by contrast, the agricultural aspect 
of association agreements continues to be the predominant factor. In 
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this they demonstrate little propensity to modify their own 
structures. Thus, for Morocco, a large share of association agreement 
importance rests on arrangements that ensure commercialization of 
oranges to the European market. Is this realiy important, however, 
for Moroccan development? From a general point of view, maintenance 
of an export structure_in which oranges play·such an important part 
for Morocco has the same meaning as in a conservative structure in 
which wine would hold an important position for Algeria. The currency 
brought in by the sale of oranges should not, in fact, be 
overestimated. 
Moreover, the type of access to the EEC market allowed by the 
association agreeme'nt emphasizes enclave characteristics which are 
manifested at present by the export sector, and the effects of such a 
characterization. In fact, the .agreement to keep income levels 
assured through protection to the European farmers, does not permit 
free access to Moroccan oranges but fixes high minimum prices for 
them. The difference between the high-minimum prices fixed by the EEC 
and the lower prices at which Moroccan exporters are able to sell 
constitutes an extra profit which has some negative effects on 
Morocco's development. The most important reason for this is that 
this profit does not s·timul ate the producers to expand production 
because their share on the European·market is limited. They can sell 
oranges at higher prices, but are not allowed to sell more oranges. 
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Secondly, this profit goes to an already rich enclave and 
leaves other sectors of agriculture unaffected. Thus the lack of 
balance in the agricultural sector, which is largely responsible for 
backwardness in the Moroccan economy, is accentuated. Although this 
might come within the social views of the monarchy, it may not take a 
proper place in a plan for development. 
The case of Moroccan• oranges appears symbolic and it leads to 
a fundamental question, nainely, is it the Community that is conducting 
a neo-co.lonialist policy, or is it the countries concerned that are 
making· conservative usage of the Community? The answer to this 
question is not simple. There is no doubt that the countries con-
cerned attribute importance to their old agricultural export struc-
ture, either failing in their attempt to overcome it or avoiding 
attempts of this nature. 
But does the-agreement allow diversification in agricultural 
exports by Maghreb partners, and diversification with regard to 
exportation of industrial products as well as the possibility of 
protection for using industries? In this sense, a more advantageous 
use may be made within the framework of association, provided that, as 
in the case of Algeria, there exists a policy of development and 
modernization. 
Nevertheless, because the policy of association is intended 
to be a better framework of cooperation for development than others, 
two observations may be made. The first is that the protection 
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_extended to processed agricultural products and safeguards ·for 
:textiles of the EEC do not constitute an advantage. After all, an 
industrialization program can be valid without being ambitious and 
capital intensive like that of Algeria, if it has a notable effect 
upon the development of industries such as textiles or foodstuffs. 
This last observation appears to be of particular importance in view 
of the advantage that Morocco and Tunisia in particular would find if 
they specialize in these products. 
There remains, then, the question of petroleum production. 
The attitude of the EEC is reserved, while awaiting the establishment 
of a common energy policy. The second observation is that commercial 
liberalization must be accompanied by a program that favors the 
industrial development of the Maghreb countries, if it is to be more 
than an empty gesture. 
Cooperation can certainly not be limited to food aid. Such 
aid is not only marginal within the sphere of cooperation, but it is 
even harmful to the extent that it competes with those crops (cereals, 
sugar) by means of. which the Maghreb nations might reach a balanced 
production of food. Assistance in the area ·of foodstuffs combined 
with the type of access reserved for agricultural products might end 
in a dangerous spiral. .As Hayer wrote, "for the countries of the 
region a combination of a high price pol icy for fluctuating exports 
-with artificially cheap imports would mean a perpetuation of 
dependent" (27, P. 82). The sphere of cooperation should evidently be 
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extended to that of finance, technology and industry. It is upon this 
basis that the framework furnished by association can be seen to be 
dynamic and effective. 
It is reasonably certain that financial cooperation will be 
directed towards loans and private investments and, to a lesser 
degree, towards grants. Here again the point of departure for any 
evaluatfon is constituted by the capability of the Maghreb nations to 
utilize these resources. For a country such as Algeria, that, to a 
certain extent, has ensured a self-regulating e.quilibrium on a long-
term basis for its balance of payments, the intervention of financial 
resources constitutes a factor of acceleration in the development 
under way. The Algerians, having chosen a highly capital intensive 
development based upon advanced techniques, must not lose contact with 
the industrial center. At· the same time they look with mistrust upon 
direct investments and are jealous of the autonomy and manueverability 
of their own economy. They are, therefore, searching for forms of 
cooperation which, while placing at their disposal financial resources 
and knowhow, are less intrusive than direct foreign investments. This 
does not mean that they do not accept them, but that they do this only 
to a limited extent and under certain conditions. 
For Tunisia and Morocco, the financial resources that the EEC 
might make available could be less advantageous for the independent 
development of the two countries. Direct investments meet no 
obstacles. The problem is knowing if and where. capital will be drawn 
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into these two countries. In spite of the ample facilities granted to 
investors, the amount of foreign capital. in Morocco has not grown very 
markedly. Tunisia has promulgated legislation which is extremely 
favorable to direct investments. Nevertheless, no advantages have 
been derived from these facilities, because foreign investments 
directed towards markets restricted as are those of Morocco and 
Tunisia constitute enclaves within a few dynamic sectors, such as 
tourism or other export sectors. 
The main purpose of the agreements between the Maghreb 
countries and the EEC was to improve the trade balance of the Maghreb 
countries. From analyzing statistics from before and after these 
agreements, the deficit has decreased only minutely since 1977 (Table 
XX). 
In the case of Morocco; the trade balance went from a surplus 
to a deficit in one year. In 1974 a trade surplus of just over 120 
million E.C.U. was recorded but by 1975 this had turned into a deficit 
of 239.2 E.C.U. This further increased to 690.0 E.C.U. in 1977 but 
went down to -501.1 E.C.U. in 1978. It again .rose in 1979 to 664.4 
E. C. U. but ·fell sharply the next year to 315. 4 E. C. U. (Tables XX, XV, 
XVI, XXI). One of the reasons for the fluctuating balance is the 
change in phosphate prices. They rose sharply in 1973-74 but fell 
sharply soon after. 
Countries which run up major deficits with one particular 
supplier often turn to another source (11). The Maghreb countries 
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have a 1 ready run up 1 arge deficits with the Community. Thus, any fa 11 
in their export earnings from the Community will induce them to get 
imports outsid~ the EEC. In addition, if the Maghreb states earn less 
income from overall exports, they will be able to purchase fewer goods 
from the EEC even if they want to buy more. Such a reduction in 
imports of the Community's goods by.the Maghreb countries would have a 
major negative effect on the export industries of the Community. The 
Maghreb countries will search for other trade partners. For example, 
in 1978 Morocco signed several trade agreements· with the Soviet Union 
which has now become a major importer of phosphates and citrus 
products from Morocco. 
The solution to the problems faced by the Maghreb countries 
caused by the entrance of Spain and Portugal into the EEC, cannot be 
found solely in the framework of the cooperation agreements. The 
Community should take the initiative to make sure this enlargement 
does not worsen the relations with the Maghreb states and possibly 
with major oil suppliers. The EEC can help fend off these problems by 
constructive adjustments of internal policies and by closer commer-
cial, financial and technical cooperation with the Maghreb countries. 
Financial ai.d from the Community should be attached to technological 
transfer so countries would develop those sectors of· industry for 
which there is a major demand at home, or for industries that are 
unlikely to have crises i.n the foreseeable future. In the farm 
sector, financial aid should concentrate on projects which will help 
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farmers convert from production of crops that compete for access to 
the EEC market with the candidate countries. The Community should 
1 ive up to its commitments with its Maghreb partners, involving 
regular consultations in parallel with the entry negotiations with the 
candidate countries themselves. 
As an evaluation of the association agreements, both in their 
present form and in the more complete one that they assume, it can be 
said that taken alone they do not appear to be instruments of sub-
ordination to European capital ism. In other words, the presentation 
of Moroccan and Tunisian structures is neither favored nor imposed by 
these agreements. It is rather the 1 ack of a progressive wi 11 that 
has induced Morocco and Tunisia to choose association with the EEC, in 
a way which serves as an instrument for the. preservation of their 
agricultural structures. Beyond this is the lack of political deci-
sions required to set in motion the development process. In the case 
of Algeria, which has made these political decisions, the possibility 
of an alternative use of relations with the EEC is significant. 
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TABLE I 
MOROCCO EXTERNAL TRADE 1967 ($ Million) 
Destination Imports % Exports % 
World 517.7 100.0 424.0 100.0 
EEC 275.7 53.2 256.8 61.0 
West Germany 46.6 9.0 34.4 8.1 
B.L.U. 5.7 1.1 13.0 3.1 
France 193.6 37.4 175.1 41.4 
Italy 18.2 3.5 16.9 4.0 
Netherlands 11.6 2.2 17.4 4.1 
Source: European Statistical Office. 
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TABLE II 
TUNISIA EXTERNAL TRADE 1967 ($Million) 
Destination Imports % Exports % 
World 261.l 100.0 149.3 100.0 
EEC 126.9 48.3 77. 6 52.0 
West Germany 19.8 7.6 14.3 • 9.6 
B. L. U. 3.2 1. 2 0.9 0.6 
France 82.8 38.8 41. 7 27.6 
.Italy 16.2 6.2 19.9 13.3 
Netherlands 4.9 1. 9 0.8 0.6 
Source: European Statistical Office. 
TABLE I II 
EEC TRADE WITH ALGERIA (Million .ECU) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
EEC EXPORTS 2,054.9 2.819.8 2.747.3 3,674.3 3.635.1 
EEC IMPORTS 2.128.5 2.049.8 2 .152. 3 2. 095. 9 2.001.4 
TRADE BALANCE 
EEC -73.6 +770.0 +595.0 +1. 578. 3 +1. 633. 7 
TRADE BALANCE 
ALGERIA +73.6 -770. 0 -595.0 -1.578.3 -1.633.7 

















BREAKDOWN OF ALGERIAN EXPORTS TO THE EEC 
1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Million Million Million Million Million Million 
ECU. % ECU % ECU % ECU % ECU % ECU % 
160.3 17.9 59.3 2.8 40.6 2.0 52. 0 2.4 52.7 2.5 35.6 1.0 
733.5 82.1 2069.2 97.2 2009.2 98.0 2100.3 97.6 2043.2 97.5 1965.8 98.2 























ALGERIAN TRADE STRUCTURE WITH THE EEC IN 1978 
EEC IMPORTS EEC EXPORTS 
'000 ECU % '000 ECU % 
Total 2. 001. 435 100 3.635.150 100 
Food and live animals 20. 232 1.0 257 .196 7 .1 
dairy.products, eggs, 72. 644 2.0 
cereals and cereal 
preparations 124.649 3.4 
fruit and vegetabls 15.598 0.8 21.127 0;6 
Beverages and tobacco 14.908 0.7 3.182 
alcoholic beverages 11. 896 598 
Crude materials, inedible 21. 965 1.1 25.637 0.7 
metalliferous ores and metal 
scrap 18.969 1.0 231 
Mineral fuels 1. 900.186 94.9 149.996 4.1 
crude petroleum oils 1. 679. 286 83.9 
petroleum by-products 43.401 2.2 117.099 3.2 
natural gas 177.089 8.8 7.489 
Animal and vegetable oils 
and fats 158 36.016 1.0 
Chemical elements and compounds 10.754 224.419 6.2 
medicinal products 22 96.763 2.7. 
plastic materials, cellulose 9 43.434 1. 2 
Manufactured goods· 23.766 1. 2 . 940. 301 25.9 
rubber manufactures 98 44.606 1. 2 
yarn, fabrics 1.108 108.135 3.0 
iron and steel 13.344 330. 671 9.1 
manufactures of metal 29 302.312 8.3 
Machinery and transport equipment 2.267 1. 789.283 49.2 
power generating machinery, 
engines 689 202.110 5.6 
machinery for specific 
industries 509 349.227 9.6 
metal working machinery 85 66.749 1.8 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 1.134 154.568 4.2 
Source: EEC Statistics. 
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TABLE VII 
EEC SHARE OF ALGERIA'S FOREIGN TRADE 
ALGERIAN IMPORTS ALGERIAN EXPORTS 
1975 1976 1977 1975 1976 1977 
66.8 65.6 59.9 49.9 • 51. 7 43.7 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community. 
TABLE VIII 
EEC TRADE WITH MOROCCO (Million $) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
EXPORTS 787.4 1.045.1 1. 316. 3 1. 524. 3 1. 341. 9 1.676.8 1.479.2 
IMPORTS 910.9 805.9 779.5 834.3 840.8 1. 012. 4 1. 163. 8 
TRADE BALANCE 
EEC -123,5 +239.2 +530.8 +690.0 +501.1 +664.4 +315.4 
MOROCCO TRADE 
BALANCE +123.5. -239.2 -530.8 -690.0 -501.1 -664.4 -315.4 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community. 
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TABLE IX 
MOROCCO'S TRADE !HTH EEC 1977 (mill ion ECU) 
Product Import Export 
(mi 11 ion EUA) % (mi 11 ion EUA) % 
Total 1. 524. 008 100 834.313 100 
FOOD PRODUCTS 74.945 4.9 321. 022 38.5 
' - Fruit & Vegetables 276.868 33.2 
·- Fi sh 30.827 3.7 
INEDIBLE RAW 
MATERIALS 36.523 2.4 259.485 31. 1 
- Raw Fertilizers 186.552 22.4 
- Non-Ferrous Meta 1 s 39.008 4.7 
BURNABLE MINERALS 43.594 2.9 2.191 0.3 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 124.357 8.2 37.440 4.5 
MANUFACTURED P O UCTS 302.905 19.9 72. 780 8.7 
MACHINES AND 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 778.144 51.1 7.554 0.9 
of which: 
- Transport Equipment 310. 699 20.4 1. 275 0.2 
- Non-Electric Machines 309.960 20.3 1.891 0.2 
- Machines and Electrical 
Appliances 157.485 10.3 4.368 0.5 
OTHERS- 163.540 10.6 133.841 16.0 
Source: Statistical Office of EEC. 
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TABLE X 
EEC TRADE WITH TUNISIA (Mi 11 ion ECU) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
EXPORTS 709.8 834.7 977 .1 1.120.5 1. 232. 5 1. 541. 3 
IMPORTS 357.3 408.6 522.2 565.2 790.3 1. 090.6 
TRADE 
BALANCE E C 352.5 426.1 424.4 455.3 442.2 +450.7 
TRADE BALANCE 
TUNISIA -352.5 -426.1 -424.4 -555.3 -462.2 -450.7 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community. 
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TABLE XI 
EEC TRADE WITH TUNISIA IN 1980 
EEC EEC 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
'ODO ECU % 'DOD ECU % 
Total LD90.610 100 1. 541. 300 100 
Food and live animals 55.912 5.1 137.869 8.9 
Dairy products and eggs 20.430 1. 3 
Fish and fish preparations 15.600 1. 4 
Cereals and cereal preparations 58 40. 774 2.7 
Fruit and vegetables 35.799 3.3 8.204 0.5 
Fresh vegetables 5.540 0.5 4.566 0.3 
Preserved vegetables 408 408 
Fresh or dried fruit 27. 726 2.5 3.050 0.2 
Preserved fruit and fruit 
preparations 2.125 180 
Sugar and sugar·pareparations 86 33.598 2.2 
Beverages, tobacco 7.899 0.7 3.529 0.2 
Alcoholic beverages 7.690 0.7 1.406 
Crude materials, inedible, 
except fuels 36. 711 3.4 36. 693 2.4 
Crude fertilizers and minerals 21. 998 2.0 20.790 1. 4 
Crude fertilizers 19.956 1.8 
Metalliferous ores 3.217 276 
Mineral fuels 388.790 35.7 104.403 6.8 
Petroleum and petroleum 
products 388.790 35.7 84.521 5.5 
Crude petroleum 368.253 33.8 
Animal oils and fats 97.042 8.9 7.423 0.5 
Vegetable oils 96.902 8.9 2.924 0.2 
Chemicals 123.352 11. 3 143.892 9.3 
Organic chemicals 142 6.624 0.4 
Dyeing, tanning and 
coloring materials 161 11. 867 0.8 
Medicinal products 3 49.001 3.2 
Essential oils and 
perfume materials 2.180 6. 677 0.4 
Manufactured fertilizers 70.924 6.5 4.032 0.3 
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TABLE XI (continued) 
EEC TRADE WITH TUNISIA IN 1980 
EEC EEC 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
'000 ECU % '000 ECU % 
Artificial plastic materials 138 36.654 2.4 
Chemical materials and 
products, n.e.S. 26 14.799 1.0 
Manufactured goods .. 67.095 • 6. 2 405.528 26.3 
Rubber manufactures 33 15.605 1.0 
Textile yarn 309 30.767 2.0 
Cotton fabrics, woven 20.485 1. 9 39.403 2.6 
Iron and steel 10 117. 447 7.6 
Non-ferrous metals 8.410 0.8 18.114 1. 2 
Manufactures of metal, n.e.S. 1.346 56.507 3.7 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 29.431 2.7 538.342 34.9 
Power generating machinery 1. 736 34. 364 · 2.2 
Specialized machinery, 
apparatus and appliances 677 113. 361 7.4 
Transport equipment 4 13.468 0.9 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 277. 984 25.5 127.651 8.3 
Clothing 262.010 24. 0 61. 408 4.0 
Footwear p.213 0.6 898 
Miscellaneous. manufactured 
articles, n.e.S. 5.345 0.5 26.601 1. 7 














TUNISIAN WINE IMPORTED BYEEC (Million ECU) 
MEMBER STATE OF DESTINATION 
FR BENELUX NL D. IT 
82.872 193 39 50.429 
98.029 41.117 26 104.005 
90.056 123.098 108 96.460 
33.660 61.141 384 87.373 
26.937 96.308 85.736 










TABLE XI I I 
MAGHREB LEGAL WORKERS IN THE EEC 
COUNTRY COUNTRY OF EMPLOYMENT TOTAL 
OF ORIGIN B DK D F IRL I LUX NL UK EEC 
ALGERIA 3.200 186 1. 583 361. 000 5 600 367.000. 
MOROCCO 37.250 1.155 16.109 181.400 17 33.656 2.000 272.000 
TUNISIA 4.700 107 10.000 73.700 3 1. 085 200 90.000 
TOTAL 45 .150 1.448 27.692 616.100 25 34. 741 2.800 729. 000 



















Source: Kurian, George Thomas, Encyclopedia of the Third World, Facts 
on File, Inc,, New York, 1980. The World Almanac and Book of 









EEC EXPORTS TO THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES 1980 (million$) 
GERMANY FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS BLEU UK 
171 856 170 80 76 111 
991 1.891 933 191 . 428 236 
268 674 379 63 76 50 
1.430 3.421 1.482 334 580 397 














EEC IMPORTS FROM THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES 1982 (million $) 
IMPORT EEC GERMANY FRANCE ITALY NETHERLANDS BLEU UK IRELAND DENMARK 
MOROCCO 1.169 193 557. 116 93 101 93 4 11 
ALGERIA 4.027 1. 641 1. 238 512 290 150 190 4 2 
TUNISIA 1. 098 226 281 446 68 51 18 4 4 
TOTAL 6.294 2. 060 2.076 1. 074 451 302 301 12 17 
Source: Statistical Office of the European Community and own calculation. 
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TABLE XVII 
EEC SHARE OF THE MAGHREB COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE AS A 







ALGERIA MOROCCO TUNISIA 
Export Import Export Import Export Import 
76.7 69.9 65.8 55.7 56.7 56.3 
59.1 64.2 59.3 53.1 57.3 61.3 
45.4 60.0 • 57.2 52.3 .51. 8 61. 2 
38.1 57.8 55.9 51. 4 57.2 58.4 
37.3 59.8 56.4 63.3 57.3 65.2 
UN Yearbook of Intern·ational Trade Statistics 1977, Vol. 1 
(Trade by Country), New York 1978, and 1976 EUROSTAT, CRONOS 
System. 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, Monthly 
external trade bulletin, Special Number for 1958-78, 





























































































EEC IMPORTS VS. EXPORTS. (ECU) 
IMPORTS 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Algeria 2049.8 2152. 3 2095.9 2001. 4 2761.1 4026.8 
Morocco 805.9 779. 5 834.3 840.8 1012.4 1163. 8 
Tunisia 357.3 408.6 522.2 565.2 790.3 1090.6 
Total 3213.0 3340.4 3452.4 3407.4 4563.8 6281. 2 
EXPORTS 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Algeria 2819.8 2747.3 3674.3 3635.1 3814.7 4710. 3 
Morocco 1045.1 1316.3 1524.3 1341.9 1676.8 1479.2 
Tunisia 709.8 834.7 977 .1 1120. 5 1232.5 1541. 3 
Total 4574.7 4898.3 6175.7 6097.5 6724.0 7730.8 
TRADE 
BALANCE -1361. 7 -1557.9 -2723. 3 -2690. 1 2160. 2 -1449.6 







COMMUNITY TRADE WITH MAGHREB COUNTRIES A A SHARE OF 
TOTAL EEC EXPORTS AND IMPORTS (1978) 
Share of Total Share of Total 




1. 9 3.6 




SPANISH CITRUS AND WINE EXPORTS TO THE EEC 1970 (t,1illion E.C.U.) 
Citrus Wine 
38.600.0 18.488.9 
Source: Direction General de Aduanas (Madrid). 
• TABLE XXIII 




















EEC OLIVE OIL IMPORT FROM SPAIN AND THE 











Source: Statistical Office of the European Community. 
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